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Abstract
We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and
additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the rev-
enue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a
weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights inuence
the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism.
This class contains e¢ cient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed
bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-
packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the
pure bundling auction and separate, e¢ cient auctions for the single ob-
jects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
1 Introduction
Very little is known about the revenue maximizing auction for multiple, het-
erogeneous objects, and we doubt that the problem is analytically tractable.
It is well known that reserve prices may increase expected revenue by inef-
ciently withholding the objects. An important and di¤erent insight is that
an optimal auction will not necessarily allocate the objects to the buyers
who value them most1. Palfrey (1983) introduced the study of bundling to
the auction literature, and showed that a pure bundling auction is revenue
The authors are grateful for nancial support from the Max Planck Research Prize. We
wish to thank Paul Milgrom, the associate editor and three referees for helpful comments
that greatly improved the paper. Jehiel and Moldovanu wish to thank Ennio Stacchetti for
many insightful discussions that shaped some of the ideas presented here. Jehiel: Paris-
Jourdan Sciences Economiques, and University College, London, jehiel@enpc.fr; Meyer-
ter-Vehn: moritz_mtv@web.de; Moldovanu: University of Bonn; mold@uni-bonn.de
1This, in principle, leaves scope for a resale market. As we want to focus on the role
of bundling, we assume here that the resale-market is absent.
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superior to separate (and e¢ cient) auctions if there are only two bidders2.
Under pure bundling, a single bidder gets all objects if she has the highest
value for the entire bundle, although other bidders attach higher values to
parts of the bundle. Under some assumptions on the distribution of valua-
tions, Chakraborty (1999) showed that there is a critical number of bidders,
below which bundling outperforms separate auctions, and above which sep-
arate auctions outperform the bundling auction. This analysis suggests that
pure bundling may increase revenue by increasing competition (i.e., by im-
portingdemand from one object to another), but that it may also decrease
revenue by creating ine¢ ciencies. The logic behind Chakrabortys result is
that, with many bidders, the ine¢ ciency e¤ect outweighs the competition
e¤ect.
The main purpose of this paper is to construct and analyze the properties
of a class of mixed bundling auctions that improve upon both pure bundling
and upon separate, e¢ cient auctions. Moreover, we o¤er a methodology that
can be used to identify the most promising bundling strategy.
In our model, valuations for bundles are equal to the sum of the valua-
tions for the included objects, so that bundling is solely driven by strategic
considerations of the auctioneer rather than by technological features of the
demand functions (such as complementarities).
The constructed mechanisms assign to each partition of objects among
the agents a partition-specic weight. For each realization of values, the im-
plemented partition is the one that maximizes the sum of the biddersvalues
and the assigned weight. Thus, our mechanisms can be seen as weighted
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, and it is a dominant strategy for bid-
ders to reveal their true values. For example, assigning a positive weight to
all partitions where some bundle of objects is not sold corresponds to intro-
ducing a reserve price on this bundle. Assigning a large positive weight to all
partitions where the objects are sold to a single buyer corresponds to a pure
bundling auction, while a smaller weight on such partitions will sometimes
allow for separate sales, thus yielding mixed bundling.
The advantages of mixed bundling have been previously pointed out in
the literature on monopolistic pricing. One might think that the optimal
pricing strategy for a monopolist selling two goods (for which customersval-
uations are known to be additive) is to price each good at the price a single-
product monopolist would optimally charge. Adams and Yellen (1976) show
(via examples) that this is not necessarily the case. McAfee et al. (1989)
generalize the non-optimality of additive pricing to arbitrarily distributed
2Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) exploit Palfreys results from the perspective of the
revenue equivalence theorem.
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valuations, and suggest a class of situations in which the optimal prices in-
clude a discount for bundles - this is referred to as mixed bundling by Adams
and Yellen3. Manelli and Vincent (2001) determine necessary conditions for
the optimal monopolistic prices for each bundle of objects, and study how
non-deterministic sale mechanisms may improve upon deterministic ones.
Armstrong (1996) considers a more general monopoly model where objects
are divisible, and he looks for optimal tari¤s. His main result is that the seller
will always want to withhold sales from some low-type buyers, no matter how
protable selling some quantity to themmight be. We can apply Armstrongs
argument to our auction model in order to show that the revenue of both pure
and mixed bundling auctions can be increased by introducing reserve prices.
Rochet and Choné (1998) further analyze the multi-product monopoly prob-
lem (by relaxing some of the assumptions used by Armstrong), and show how
bunching (i.e. di¤erent types get the same allocation) is a robust feature of
the optimal mechanism.
Since monopoly pricing can be viewed as an auction design with a unique
potential bidder, one contribution of this paper is to generalize the idea of
mixed bundling from monopoly pricing to the more involved theory of auc-
tions. For example, the proof of Proposition 4 parallels an insight obtained
by McAfee et al. (1989).
Most of the auction literature (and, in particular, that literature searching
for optimal mechanisms) has studied models where each bidders information
can be represented by a one-dimensional signal. Most prominently, Myerson
(1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) nd the revenue-maximizing auction4
(in the class of Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rules) for the private
values, one-object case. If bidders are ex-ante symmetric, the optimal auction
is a second-price auction with a reserve price. Hence this mechanism is
implementable in dominant strategies, and, as mentioned above, belongs to
the class of mechanisms discussed here.
Models with one-dimensional signals are of limited use for studies of auc-
tions for multiple, heterogeneous objects. Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1999) have shown that the main di¢ culty with multi-dimensional signals is
that incentive compatibility constraints5 yield a complex integrability con-
dition on the vector of interim expected probabilities with which buyers get
3In other cases the optimal prices contain a surcharge for the bundle instead of a dis-
count. This raises the problem of deterring customers from buying the objects separately
in order to evade the surcharge.
4Bulow and Roberts (1989) illustrate the parallels between optimal auction design and
monopolistic pricing for one object.
5These constraints reduce to a monotonicity condition when private information is
one-dimensional.
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the various bundles6. Thus, under this constraint the maximization problem
is very hard - this is the main obstacle in front of a characterization of the
revenue-maximizing multi-object auction. Instead of trying to characterize
such an auction, we focus here on a large class of mechanisms that includes
pure and mixed bundling, as well as separate, e¢ cient auctions. A major
practical advantage is that revenue maximization in this class reduces to an
optimization problem over vectors of real numbers (the weights attached to
the partitions) that can be numerically solved by any personal computer.
Armstrong (2000) and Avery and Hendershott (2000) study 2-object auc-
tions in discrete settings. In particular, Armstrong nds that the revenue
maximizing auction is e¢ cient. The discrepancy to our results stems from
Armstrongs assumption that valuations are binary, i.e. they can either be
high or low, but not intermediate. This leaves no scope for mixed
bundling, as analyzed in this paper7.
As the focus of this paper is to identify and describe a tractable way of
improving auction revenues rather than to characterize the optimal auction,
we do not consider here how Bayes-Nash implementation might improve rev-
enues over dominant strategy implementation. Mookerjee and Reichelstein
(1992) describe a class of mechanism design problems (including the quest for
a revenue-maximizing one object auction) where using the stronger require-
ment of dominant strategies is without loss of generality. Their result does
not hold for general models with multidimensional signals, and very little is
known about this issue in such contexts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model, and
introduces the weighted Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanisms. In Section 3 we
rst calculate derivatives of revenue and expected revenue with respect to the
weights attached to each partition of objects (Theorem 1). In Subsection 3.1
we use this Theorem to show how to improve upon pure bundling and pre-
packaged auctions (Proposition 1). In Subsection 3.2 we use the Theorem in
order to show how to improve upon separate, e¢ cient auctions (Proposition
2). This results also identies the most promising directions for increasing the
weights on partitions around the e¢ cient auction (where all weights are zero).
The results in this Subsection depend on a condition on the distribution
of values that requires symmetry among agents and independence across
objects. Proposition 3 in Subsection 3.3 combines the above insights, and
6These authors also translate the integrability constraint into a geometric condition
about the boundaries of the regions in the type spaces where various allocations are chosen.
The condition says that the vector representing the jump in the allocation must be
perpendicular to the boundary where the jump occurs.
7Armstrong notes that when the type spaces increases in size, the revenue-maximizing
auction should not be expected to remain e¢ cient.
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shows that a simple mixed bundling auction improves both upon the pure
bundling auction and upon the e¢ cient auction. This Subsection ends with
a numerical example where we solve for the optimal level of mixed bundling.
Proposition 4 in Subsection 3.4 shows that the revenue enhancing e¤ect of
mixed bundling is robust to the introduction of (optimal) reserve prices.
Section 3.5 contains an example showing that the optimal weighted Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism may be asymmetric even in symmetric situations.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A seller s owns a set K of K heterogeneous objects. There is a set N =
f1; ::; i; j; ::; Ng of potential buyers (whom we also call bidders, or agents).
Each bidder i privately knows her valuation vik for of each object k: For the
seller, we assume vsk = 0. We assume that agent is valuation for a subset
Pi  K of objects is given by8 viPi :=
P
k2Pi v
i
k, and that her utility function
is quasi-linear in money. Thus, a bidder receiving bundle Pi for a payment
of T has a utility of
P
k2Pi v
i
k   T .
We assume that vik can take values on an interval

vk; v
k
  R+0 , and that
v = (vik)i;k is distributed according to a continuous, strictly positive density
function f : 
! R+0 where 
 =
Q
k2K

vk; v
k
N
. The K-dimensional type of
agent i is denoted by vi 2Qk2K vk; vk, and v i 2Qk2K vk; vkN 1 denotes
the K (N   1)-dimensional vector of all but bidder is valuations.
The outcome of an auction is a labeled partition P = (Ps; P1; :::; PN) 2 P
of objects and a vector of transfers (ti)i2f1:::Ng 2 RN : The interpretation is
that bidder i 2 f1; :::; Ng receives bundle Pi, the seller keeps the bundle Ps,
and bidder i makes a payment of ti to the seller. Pbun  P denotes the subset
of pure bundling allocations, i.e. P 2 Pbun ) 9i 2 N ; such that Pi = K.
We study deterministic, dominant strategy, direct revelation mechanisms
(g; t) : 
! PRN that specify for each vector of valuations v an allocation
g (v) and payments from each agent ti (v). By payo¤ equivalence (see e.g.
Green and La¤ont (1979) , and Holmstrom (1979)), the payments in any
dominant strategy mechanism are, up to a constant, pinned down by the
allocation rule g.
Two such mechanisms immediately come to mind: separate Vickrey auc-
tions (one for each object), and a Vickrey auction for the bundle of all the
8This model immediately extends to any kind of complementarities or substitutabilities
between objects. We focus on additive valuations in order to single out the strategic e¤ect
of bundling.
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objects:
1) In the separate auctions every object goes to the bidder who values it
most: g (v) = argmaxP2P
nP
j2N v
j
Pj
o
. This allocation rule is implemented
in dominant strategies by the well-known second-price transfer rule which
charges bidder i the highest rejected bid on each object she receives.
2) In the (pure) bundling auction the set of all objects goes to the bidder
who values highest the entire lot: g (v) = argmaxP2Pbun
nP
j2N v
j
Pj
o
. Charg-
ing the successful bidder the highest rejected bid on the entire lot makes this
mechanism strategy-proof.
2.1 General -auctions
We now dene a large class of auctions that encompasses many well-known
formats, including the two mentioned above:
Denition 1 For a given real vector  = fPgP2P let
g (v) := argmax
P2P
(X
j2N
vjPj + P
)
(1)
and
g i (v) := argmax
P2P
(X
j 6=i
vjPj + v
i
Pi
+ P
)
The -auction (g; t)is dened by the allocation rule9 g = g (v) , and by
the transfer rule
ti (v) =  
 X
j 6=i
vjg(v)j
+ g(v)
!
+  i (v) (2)
where  i (v) =
P
j 6=i v
j
g i (v)j

+ vi
g i (v)i
+ g i (v)
.
To interpret the above denition, we suggest a conceptual trick: Con-
sider an additional, ctitious agent who does not hold private information
and cannot receive objects, but who attaches a value of P to allocation
9To circumvent the problem of tie-breaks in cases where argmax sets are not singletons,
we assume throughout the paper that ties are broken according to a xed order on P. The
tie-breaking rule does not matter given our assumption of an atomless distribution.
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P . The -auction is then the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for the en-
larged set of agents. The precise value of  i (v
 i) - which is irrelevant for the
dominance argument - is determined so that vi, the lowest type of bidder i,
always receives zero utility in the truth-telling equilibrium of the -auction,
in analogy to the Clarke mechanism. Note also that a bidder who receives
no objects makes no payments10.
Together with payo¤-equivalence, the above observations immediately
yield:
Lemma 1 1) Truth-telling is a dominant strategy in an -auction. 2) Ex-
post participation constraints are satised, and the lowest type of a bidder has
a utility of zero in the truth-telling equilibrium. 3) Given the allocation rule
g, the transfer rule t is the unique one with the above properties. Thus, t
is the highest transfer rule implementing g.
We now show how several well-known auction formats t into the class
of -auctions.
Example 1  Separate second-price auctions for the K objects with re-
serve price rk for object k are represented by the -auction where P =P
k2Ps rk, i.e. the weight on an allocation is the sum of the reservation
prices over all the objects that are not sold.
 The pure bundling auction is represented by the -auction where P =P
k
 
vk   vk

for pure bundling allocations P  Pbun , and P = 0 else.
This ensures that argmaxP2P
nP
j2N v
j
Pj
+ P
o
2 Pbun for all possible
realizations of v.
 More generally, consider any partition Q = fQ1; ::; Qg of K. A pre-
packaged auction with partition Q is represented by the -auction where
P =
P
k
 
vk   vk

if the allocation P is compatible with the partition
Q (i.e. each sub-bundle Q is allocated to one bidder11) , and P = 0
else.
 Pure bundling with reserve price r on the bundle is represented by the -
auction where P =
P
k
 
vk   vk

for P 2 Pbun, P =
P
k
 
vk   vk

+r
for P with Ps = K; and P = 0 else.
10This is because in this case g i (v) = g (v) and v
i
g i (v)i
= 0, as i receives no object.
11This means:8 2 f1; :::; g ;9i 2 N : Q  Pi.
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Weighted VCG mechanisms have been used by Roberts (1979) in order to
characterize all dominant-strategy (not necessarily e¢ cient) implementable
choice rules in a general social choice setting. Note that, however large, the
class of choice rules implemented by -auctions is, it is a strict subclass of
dominant-strategy implementable choice rules12. It is not even true that all
anonymous allocation mechanisms are -auctions13. We focus on  auctions
since this class is analytically tractable, and since, as illustrated above, it
includes well known auction formats and their convex combinations.
3 Optimal Bundling
In this Section we study how expected revenue depends on the choice of the
 parameters. The main working horse for the subsequent results is Theorem
1 which computes partial derivatives of revenue with respect to . We then
apply this result in order to show how to improve the revenue from the pure
bundling auction by making it slightly less ine¢ cient, and how to improve
upon the revenue of e¢ cient auctions by rendering them slightly less e¢ cient.
After looking at these extreme cases, we focus on mixed-bundling auctions,
a one-dimensional subclass of -auctions, which generalizes the idea of a
discount on a bundle of objects in monopolistic mixed bundling.
Let us rst introduce some notation. Given xed, truthfully reported
12In contrast to Roberts (1979), there is no simple characterization of all dominant
strategy implementable choice rules in our framework. For example allocating goods only
to bidder i, according to an arbitrary function of bidder js signal is implementable. The
reason is, basically, the absence of allocative externalities. If bidders preferences were
allowed to depend on the entire prole of allocations (as opposed to their allocation only),
Roberts result would apply and the set of allocation rules implementable in dominant
strategy would be the set of a¢ ne maximizers (i.e., the same as -auctions except that the
weight given to the various bidders may be di¤erent). See Bickchandani et al. (2004), Gui
et al. (2004) and Lavi et al. (2004) for recent research on the study of dominant strategy
implementation in externality-free environments.
13Consider the following 1-object allocation mechanism: bidder i receives the good for
a payment of ti = 2vj if vi > 2vj ; bidder j receives the good for a payment of tj = 2vi if
vj > 2vi; the seller keeps the object in all other cases. This mechanism is easily seen to
be strategy-proof but it is not a -auction. We are grateful to a referee that o¤ered this
counter-example.
.
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valuations v in the -auction, denote by
R (v) =
X
i
ti (v) ;
S (v) =
X
i
vig(v)i ;
BS (v) = S (v) R (v) =
X
i

vig(v)i   t
i
 (v)

realized revenue, social surplus and bidder surplus, respectively. Also, de-
note by R () = Ev [R (v)] , S () = Ev [S (v)], and BS () = Ev [BS (v)]
expected revenue, expected social surplus, and expected bidder surplus, re-
spectively.
Theorem 1 1. Fix v and P 2 P. Let I be the indicator function,
and let P 00 = argmaxP 0 6=P
nP
j2N v
j
P 0j
+ P 0
o
. The revenue R (v) is
a piecewise linear function of P , and has a single discontinuity of
(
P
j v
j
Pj
 Pj vjP 00j ) at P := Pj2N vjP 00j +P 00  Pj2N vjPj : Whenever
di¤erentiable, its derivative is given by:
@
@P
R (v) =
X
i

 If(;v):g(v)=Pg + If(;v):g i (v)=Pg

(3)
2. Expected revenue is a di¤erentiable function of P with partial deriva-
tive given by:
@R
@P
() =
@S
@P
() +
X
i2N
  Pr (g (v) = P ) + Pr  g i (v) = P (4)
Proof. 1) The revenue e¤ect of changing  can be decomposed into a
surplus generation e¤ect, and a surplus extraction e¤ect :
R (v) = S (v) BS (v) :
Social surplus depends on  only via the chosen allocation g (v). Therefore
S (v) is a step function of P with a discontinuity of (
P
j2N v
j
Pj
 Pj2N vjP 00j )
at the point P where the allocation switches from P
00 to P , i.e., at
P :=
X
j2N
vjP 00j
+ P 00  
X
j2N
vjPj :
Thus, its derivative is zero whenever it is well-dened.
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Bidder is surplus is given by:
vig(v)i   t
i
 (v) =
X
vjg(v)j
+ g(v)    i (v)
=
X
vjg(v)j
+ g(v)  
X
j 6=i
vj
g i (v)j
  vi
g i (v)i
  g i (v):
The bidderssurplus is given by:
BS (v) =
X
i
"
max
P2P
(X
j2N
vjPj + P
)
 max
P
(X
j 6=i
vjPj + v
i
Pi
+ P
)#
Thus, BS (v) is the di¤erence of maxima of continuous functions. As such,
it is continuous and piecewise linear in P . Its derivative is given by:
@
@P
BS (v) =
X
i

If(;v):g(v)=Pg   If(;v):g i (v)=Pg

(5)
The claim follows by combining the two insights above.
2) Again, we compute the revenue e¤ect as the di¤erence of the e¤ects on
total surplus, and on bidder surplus. The latter is computed by integration
of equation 5 with respect to v:
@
@P
BS () =
@
@P
Ev [BS (v)]
= Ev

@
@P
BS (v)

= Ev
"X
i
If(;v):g(v)=Pg   If(;v):g i (v)=Pg
#
=
X
i
 
Pr (g (v) = P )  Pr
 
g i (v) = P

For the second equation, we used Lebesgues theorem and the Lipschitz-
continuity of BS (v) in  in order to exchange the order of di¤erentiation
and integration.
It remains to show that, unlike realized social surplus, expected social
surplus is di¤erentiable as a function of P , i.e. that @S@P () exists. To do
so, denote by
@ (P; P
0) :=
(
v 2 
 : P; P 0 2 argmax
P2P
 X
j2N
vjPj + P
!)
10
the boundary in the type space between areas where g chooses allocations
P and P 0, respectively, and by dNK 1v the NK   1 dimensional Lebesgue
measure. With this notation, we compute @S
@P
() by applying Leibnizs
rule to integrate the discontinuity of realized social surplus S (v) over all
valuations at which the discontinuity occurs:
@S
@P
() =
X
P 02P
Z
@(P;P 0)
 X
j2N
vjPj  
X
j2N
vjP 0j
!
f (v) dNK 1v
Given the continuity of f , this expression is well dened for all .
Note that
P
j2N v
j
Pj
 Pj2N vjP 0j is constant, and equal to (P 0   P )
on the set @ (P; P 0). Let j@ (P; P 0)j =
R
@(P;P 0)
f (v) dNK 1v be the measure
of @ (P; P 0). Since @@P Pr (g = P
0) =   j@ (P; P 0)j, we obtain that
@S
@P
() =
X
P 02P
(P 0   P ) j@ (P; P 0)j =  
X
P 02P
(P 0   P ) @
@P
Pr (g = P
0)
We will apply this equation in Proposition 4 where we analyze the e¤ect of
mixed bundling on auctions with (optimal) reserve prices.
Recall the interpretation of the -auction as the e¢ cient auction for soci-
ety including a virtual agent whose preferences are determined by . Chang-
ing these preferences a¤ects the externality that agent i imposes on the vir-
tual agent, and this translates into a change of agent is payment. For a
xed allocation g (v) , the marginal externality is given by the term under
the summation in equation (3). When the allocation g (v) is a¤ected by the
change in , the aggregated externality on the virtual agent that results from
changing the allocation from P 00 to P equals the discontinuity in aggregated
payments of the real agents:
P 00   P :=
X
j
vjPj  
X
j
vjP 00j
:
For an illustration, consider a single-good auctioneer setting a reserve
price, and recall that a reserve price corresponds to a weight on the alloca-
tion where the auctioneer keeps the object. To determine the optimal reserve
price, the auctioneer is trading o¤ the marginal loss of e¢ ciency due to miss-
ing the opportunity to sell, against the marginal gain of additional revenue.
For any realized v, the e¢ ciency loss is captured by the discontinuity of
R (v). The marginal revenue from agent i is captured by the term under
the summation in equation (3): it equals 1 for realizations of v in which only
the valuation of agent i exceeds the reserve price. In expectation, the e¢ -
ciency loss is captured by the rst term of equation (4) , while the expected
11
marginal revenue from i equals agent is expected externality on the virtual
agent, represented by the term under summation in equation (4).
3.1 Improving upon pure bundling and pre-packaged
auctions
We now apply Theorem 1 to the pure bundling auction, and we show how to
increase revenue by allowing separate sales for extreme realizations. Recall
that the pure bundling auction is represented by the -auction where P =P
k
 
vk   vk

for P  Pbun , and P = 0 else. Decreasing the parameter P
for P 2 Pbun will allow allocations other than pure bundling to be chosen.
Denition 2 The c-bundling auction (gc; tc) is the -auction with:
P :=

c if P 2 Pbun
0 else.
We denote by Rc (v) the revenue of a c-bundling auction for a given realiza-
tion of v; and by R(c) the expected revenue. Let c := inf fc : gc (
)  Pbung
be the smallest value of c for which the c-bundling auction is the pure bundling
auction14.
Proposition 1 1. For su¢ ciently small " > 0, and for any realization of
v, the revenue of the (c ")- bundling auction is higher than the revenue
of the pure bundling auction: Rc " (v)  Rc (v) , with strict inequality
for v such that gc " (v) =2 Pbun. In particular, R(c   ") > R(c) for
generic distribution functions.
2. The revenue of a pre-packaged auction with partition Q is increased by
uniformly lowering the parameter P on all allocations P compatible
with Q below the corresponding threshold value cQ .
Proof. 1) Consider rst v with gc " (v) 2 Pbun. By part 1 of Theorem
1 we get that
Rc (v) Rc " (v) =
Z c
c "
@
@c
Rc (v) dc =
Z c
c "
X
P2Pbun
@
@P
Rc (v) dc
=
Z c
c "
X
P2Pbun
X
i

 If(c;v):gc(v)=Pg + If(;v):g ic (v)=Pg

dc
=
X
i
Z c
c "

 If(c;v):gc(v)2Pbung + If(;v):g ic (v)2Pbung

dc
14We assume that ties in the c-bundling auction are broken in favor of pure bundling
allocations.
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As we assumed gc " (v) 2 Pbun we have, a fortiori, that gc (v) 2 Pbun for
all c 2 [c   "; c], yielding that the integrand is non-positive and the result
follows.
Consider now v with gc " (v) =2 Pbun: Denote by
ec(v) := inf fc 2 [c   "; c] : gc (v) 2 Pbung
the lowest value of c for which a pure bundling allocation is chosen at realiza-
tion v. By Theorem 1 the discontinuity of Rc (v) at c = ec(v) equals exactly
 ec(v). We get:
Rc (v) Rc " (v)
=
X
i
Z c
c "

 If(c;v):gc(v)2Pbung + If(;v):g ic (v)2Pbung

dc  ec(v)
As the rst term is bounded above by N", this expression is strictly negative
for small enough ".
2) The pre-packaged auction with partition Q can be interpreted as a
set of separate pure-bundling auctions for each of the packages Q. Thus,
the result follows by applying part 1 to each of these separate pure-bundling
auctions.
The above argument can be equally used to show that a pure bundling
auction with a reserve price can be improved upon by allowing for separate
sales in extreme cases.
3.2 Improving upon the e¢ cient auction
By denition, the social surplus S () is maximized at the e¢ cient auction
where  = 0: Therefore, rS (0) = 0: Together with Theorem 1, this obser-
vation yields:
Corollary 2
@R
@P
(0) =
X
i2N
  Pr (g0 (v) = P ) + Pr  g i0 (v) = P
Thus, a necessary condition for the e¢ cient auction to maximize revenue
in the class of (P )P2P-auctions is :
8P 2 P ;
X
i2N
  Pr (g0 (v) = P ) + Pr  g i0 (v) = P = 0 (6)
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This is a highly non-generic condition on the density function governing
the distribution of the signals v. In other words, by introducing a small P
for some P one can almost always improve upon the e¢ cient auction15.
We now add some more structure to the distributions of valuations in
order to better identify the most promising directions in which to improve
on the e¢ cient auction. Specically, we make the following symmetry as-
sumption that will be used throughout the subsection:
Condition 3 (SAIO ) Valuations v = (vik)i;k are distributed symmetrically
across agents and independently across objects. Formally, the density func-
tion f satises: 1) f (:::; vi; :::; vj; :::) = f (:::; vj; :::; vi; :::) , and 2) f (v) =Q
k2K fk (vk), where fk :

vk; v
k
N ! R+0 is the marginal density with respect
to object k.
Proposition 2 Assume that condition SAIO is met, and denote by #P :=
# fi 2 N : Pi 6= ;g , the number of bidders receiving some objects in alloca-
tion P . We have
@R
@P
(0) =
NK 1(N  #P )  (N   1)K
NK 1 (N   1)K ; for P with Ps = ; (7)
@R
@P
(0) = 0; for P with Ps 6= ;
In particular, introducing a bundling parameter P = c for all P 2
Pbun leads to an increase in expected revenue versus the expected revenue
in the e¢ cient auction.
Proof. Consider rst P with Ps = ;:As the density function f is assumed
to be symmetrical across bidders, the probability Pr (k 2 g0 (v)i) of bidder i
having the highest valuation for some object k equals 1
N
. As valuations are
assumed to be independent across objects, the probability of an allocation
P being e¢ cient is obtained by multiplying this constant probability over
all objects: Pr (g0 (v) = P ) = 1NK . To determine Pr
 
g i0 (v) = P

we apply
the same logic, and we obtain Pr
 
g i0 (v) = P

= 1
(N 1)K if Pi = ; , and
Pr
 
g i0 (v) = P

= 0 else.
15 The FOC need not be su¢ cient for a global maximum, as R () need not be a concave
function of : Subsection 3.5 contains an example showing that the best -auction may be
asymmetric even in symmetric situations, thereby illustrating the potential non-concavity
of R().
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Using Corollary 2, we obtain:
@R
@P
(0) =
X
i2N
[ Pr (g0 (v) = P ) + Pr
 
g i0 (v) = P

]
=   N
NK
+
N  #P
(N   1)K =
NK 1(N  #P )  (N   1)K
NK 1 (N   1)K
For P with Ps 6= ; the result follows from noticing that Pr (g0 (v) = P ) =
Pr
 
g i0 (v) = P

= 0. Introducing a small reserve price has an expected
marginal e¤ect of zero as both the size of the e¤ect, and the probability of
the realization of the case are marginal16.
The second part of the Proposition follows by observing that #P = 1 for
P 2 Pbun: Thus, we obtain
@R
@c
(0) =
X
P2Pbun
@R
@P
(0) = N
NK 1(N   1)  (N   1)K
NK 1 (N   1)K
= N (N   1) (N
K 1   (N   1)K 1
NK 1 (N   1)K ) > 0.
Remark 1 Note that @R
@P
(0) is decreasing in #P , positive for #P = 1, neg-
ative for #P = min fN;Kg and positive for every xed #P  min fN;Kg 1
as either N orK tends towards innity. Thus, in the space of parameter com-
binations  = (P )P2P increasing P locally around the e¢ cient auction has
the highest positive impact for P 2 Pbun. Raising P for partitions P that
allocate objects to all bidders, #P = N , or that sell the objects as singletons,
#P = K, decreases expected revenue.
Remark 2 To broaden our focus let us consider raising P for all allocations
P that are derived from a partition Q: Q1 ] ::: ]Q , i.e. for all P such that
8 2 f1; :::; g ; 9i : Q = Pi. By denition, precisely  agents receive objects
in each of these allocations. To compute the number of such P , observe that
16It is worth bearing in mind, that the partial derivatives at the e¢ cient auction need
not be a good indicator for the impact of signicantly increasing P . It is well known that
the introduction of a largereserve price can have a large impact on expected revenue.
Note also that the optimal one-object auction for heterogeneous bidders as in Myerson
(1981) need not be an -auction. This is because, in general, it sets di¤erent reserve prices
for di¤erent agents, which a -auction can not do.
.
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there are N possibilities to allocate bundle Q1, N   1 possibilities to allocate
bundle Q2, and so on. Thus, we getX
P derived from Q
@R
@P
(0) =
N !
(N   )!
NK 1(N   )  (N   1)K
NK 1 (N   1)K
The revenue impact only depends on  ; the number of sub-bundles in the
partition; but not on whether Q divides up the objects evenly or not. Similarly
to equation 7 , the obtained expression is positive for small  and becomes
negative for  close to min fN;Kg : But now it is not strictly decreasing in
 . Therefore the largest impact comes from raising P for all P with an
intermediate  . For example, in a setting with 5 bidders and 3 objects, we
obtain that, optimally,  = 2: Thus, the partition Q should contain two sub-
bundles of one and two objects, respectively.
We note in the next example that, without condition SAIO, @R
@P
(0) may
be negative even for P with #P = 1:
Example 2 Let

vk; v
k

= [0; 1] and assume that vi are i.i.d. but that there is
correlation between objects. Specically let vi be distributed on [0; 1]K in a way
that puts probability 1
2
uniformly on

0; 1
2
K
and probability 1
2
on the upper
diagonal
n
(x; :::; x) 2 [0; 1]K : x  1
2
o
. Here @R
@P
(0) < 0 for P 2 Pbun.
Proof. Let P 2 Pbun: Due to symmetry between agents we have that
@R
@P
(0) =
1
N
X
i2N
 
Pr
 
g i0 (v) 2 Pbun
  Pr (g0 (v) 2 Pbun)
Let us rst evaluate Pr (g0 (v) 2 Pbun): With probability 1 
 
1
2
N
there is at
least one agent i with signal vi on the upper diagonal, in which case there
is a bidder who has the highest valuation for all objects. With probability 
1
2
N
this is not the case, and the probability of there being an overall winner
is
 
1
N
K 1
. Thus
Pr (g0 (v) 2 Pbun) = 1 

1
2
N
+

1
2
N 
1
N
K 1
(8)
Analogously, we get that
Pr
 
g i0 (v) 2 Pbun

= 1 

1
2
N 1
+

1
2
N 1
1
N   1
K 1
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As [1   1
2
N
+
 
1
2
N   1
N
K 1
] is increasing in N; we obtain that
@R
@P
(0) =
1
N
X
i2N
 
Pr
 
g i0 (v) 2 Pbun
   Pr (g0 (v) 2 Pbun) < 0
3.3 Mixed Bundling Auctions
So far we have made use of local arguments to show that neither pure
bundling nor separate auctions can be optimal (under SAIO). In this sub-
section, we focus on the mixed bundling auctions as introduced in Denition
2. This class is parametrized by a parameter c that acts as a surcharge on
the payment of a bidder who receives some, but not all, of the objects (or,
equivalently, as a discount on the payment of a bidder who receives the entire
lot). By denition, this class encompasses the e¢ cient auction, represented
by the c-bundling auction with c = 0, and the pure bundling auction, repre-
sented by the c-bundling auction with c = c = inf fc : gc (
)  Pbung. As a
corollary to Propositions 1 and 2, we get:
Proposition 3 Assume that condition SAIO is met. Then there exists c 2
(0; c) such that the c bundling auction achieves a higher expected revenue
than both the pure bundling auction and the e¢ cient auction.
Proof. Expected revenue is a continuous function of c: Thus, it must have
a maximum on the closed interval [0; c]: Proposition 1 showed the maximum
cannot be at c = c;while Proposition 2 showed that the maximum cannot
be at c = 0:
To understand the comparative statics for c in the interior of [0; c], con-
sider the case of two bidders i; j. Then the formula for payments reduces
to:
tic (v) =
8<:
vjK if P
i = K,
vjPi + c if ; 6= P i ( K,
0 if P i = ;.
(9)
Increasing the bundling parameter by " increases revenue by 2" for val-
uations such that the objects are sold separately. It decreases revenue dis-
continuously by c for valuations such that the " increase in c leads to a
bundling allocation being chosen instead of the e¢ cient one. Figure 1 shows
the realized revenue Rc (v) for some xed values of v as a function of c.
Proposition 2 stated that introducing mixed bundling to the e¢ cient auc-
tion increases revenue (since the externality on the virtual bidder is added as
17
cS
i min vki
min Si vki
0
Rc(v)
R
min Si vki
    -S
i min vki
Figure 1: Realized Revenue Rc (v) as a function of c (xing v such that
bundling is ine¢ cient).
a surcharge on bidderspayments). This is reected in the positive slope of
Rc (v) at c = 0. Proposition 1 stated that making the pure bundling auction
slightly less ine¢ cient by lowering c also increases revenue. This is reected
in the upward jump in Rc (v) when c moves from right to left.
We now analytically compute the optimal bundling parameter in a simple
example.
Example 3 There are two bidders i; j competing for two objects A;B. Val-
uations are uniformly and independently distributed on [0; 1]. The revenue-
maximizing bundling parameter is c = 1
3
.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we know that dR(c)
dc
= dS(c)
dc
+ 2Pr(gc (v) =2 Pbun).
As the marginal loss in expected social welfare is the ine¢ ciency c times the
marginal probability that this ine¢ ciency is incurred, d
dc
Pr(gc (v) 2 Pbun),
we get that:
dR (c)
dc
=  c d
dc
Pr(gc (v) 2 Pbun) + 2Pr(gc (v) =2 Pbun)
Note that Pr(gc (v) =2 Pbun) = 2Pr(gc (v) = [;; fAg ; fBg]) . Only for fvjA <
1  c; vjB > cg there are vi such that gc (v) = [;; fAg ; fBg]. The area of this
region of i0s valuations is given by
 
1   vjA + c  vjB   c, as is illustrated
in gure 2. This yields:
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vAi
vBi
0 vAj+cvAj-c
vBj+c
vBj-c
1
1
B
A
AB
F
Figure 2: is allocation (;; A;B or AB) as a function of vi on a slice through
the 4-dimensional type space for xed vjA; v
j
B.
Pr(gc (v) =2 Pbun) = 2
Z 1
c
Z 1 c
0
 
1   vjA + c  vjB   c dvjAdvjB = 12 (1  c)4
Thus, we get:
dR (c)
dc
= (1  c)4   2c (1  c)3
Note that dR(c)
dc
= 0 for c = 1
3
. To calculate expected revenue, we use the
fact that R (0) = 2
3
(twice the expectation of the second-order statistic of two
random variables distributed uniformly on [0; 1]) , and we get
R (c) =
2
3
+ c  3c2 + 4c3   5
2
c4 +
3
5
c5:
Thus, we obtain R(0) = 2
3
; R(c) = R(1) = 23
30
 0:766; and R(1
3
) =
637
810
 0:786: The improvement caused by mixed bundling seems small in this
particular example. But, of course, it can get quite large if valuations are
increased. A meaningful calibration can only be done within the context of
specic applications.
3.4 Reserve prices
Reserve prices are known to increase revenue (see Myerson, 1981). Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 show that, when the seller cannot retain the objects, neither
separate nor pure bundling auctions can be optimal. Could it be that sep-
arate auctions with well adjusted reserve prices are optimal? The general
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formula for marginal revenue in Theorem 1 (equation 4) suggested that this
would require strict conditions on the distribution on valuations.
In this subsection we go beyond the above insight by showing that, analo-
gously to the e¢ cient auction, separate auctions with optimal reserve prices
can be improved upon by the introduction of mixed bundling if condition
SAIO is met. For example, in the setting of Example 3, optimal sepa-
rate auctions (with a reserve price of 0:5 on each object) yield a revenue
of R (0; (0:5; 0:5)) = 0:833 , while a mixed bundling auction with a bundling
parameter of 0:3 and reserve prices of 0:6 on each object yield a revenue of
R (0:3; (0:6; 0:6)) = 0:870.
We denote by (gc;r; tc;r) the c-bundling auction with a vector of reserve
prices r = (r1; :::; rK), i.e, the -auction17 with:
P :=

c if P 2 Pbun,P
k2Ps rk else.
Denote the expected revenue (resp. surplus, resp. bidders surplus) of the
above auction by R (c; r) (resp. S (c; r) ; BS (c; r)).
Proposition 4 Assume that condition SAIO is met. If @R
@rk
(0; r) = 0 for
some k with rk 2 (vk; vk), then it holds that @R@c (0; r) > 0. In particular,
@R
@c
(0; r) > 0 for optimal reserve prices r:
Proof. Splitting up @R
@rk
(0; r) = 0 into e¤ects on social surplus and bid-
ders surplus, respectively, we get that
0 =
@S
@rk
(0; r)  @BS
@rk
(0; r)
= rk
@
@rk
Pr (k =2 g0;r (v)s) + Pr (k =2 g0;r (v)s)
=
X
i

rk
@
@rk
Pr (k 2 g0;r (v)i) + Pr (k 2 g0;r (v)i)

Due to symmetry among bidders, this equation must hold for every i. Using
independence between objects, we get that
0 = rk
@
@rk
Pr (k 2 g0;r (v)i jl 2 g0;r (v)i ;8l 6= k)
+Pr (k 2 g0;r (v)i jl 2 g0;r (v)i ;8l 6= k) ;
17Note that c acts as a discount on the reserve prices if a bidder purchases the full
bundle. This is somewhat arbitrary, as we could also dene a (c; r)-auction by setting
P =
P
k2Ps rk + c for P = (K; ;; :::; ;).
20
Multiplying by Pr (l 2 g0;r (v)i ;8l 6= k) ; and noting that
@
@rk
Pr (l 2 g0;r (v)i ;8l 6= k) = 0 yields:
rk
@
@rk
Pr (g0;r (v)i = K) + Pr (g0;r (v)i = K) = 0
Denote by Ki the allocation where agent i receives all the objects and
by Ki
bk the allocation where agent i receives all objects besides object
k; which stays with the seller. Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that
@
@P
Pr (g = P
0) =   j@ (P; P 0)j. Thus we get
0 = rk
X
P with k2Ps
  j@0;r (P;Ki)j+ Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)
Note that the dimension of @0;r (P;Ki) - the boundary between the subsets of
valuations where the allocations P and Ki are chosen by g0;r - is lower than
NK   1: This implies j@0;r (P;Ki)j = 0 for all P 6= Ki
bk which, in turn,
yields:
 rk
@0;r Ki; (bk)Ki+ Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki) = 0 (10)
To calculate  @BS
@c
(0; r), we rst note that, by the proof of Theorem 1,
we have:
@BS
@Ki
(0; r) =
X
j
 
Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)  Pr
 
g j0;r (v) = Ki

< Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)  Pr
 
g i0;r (v) = Ki

= Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)
The inequality stems from the fact that g0;r (v) = Ki which ensures that
g j0;r (v) = Ki for j 6= i. We thus obtain:
 @BS
@c
(0; r) =  
X
i
@BS
@Ki
(0; r) >  
X
i
Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)
Reassembling, we get
@R
@c
(0; r) =
@S
@c
(0; r)  @BS
@c
(0; r)
>
X
i

rk
@0;r Ki bk ;Ki  Pr (g0;r (v) = Ki)
= 0
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where the last equality follows from equation 10.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows: At the optimal reserve price,
a slight reduction in the reserve price leads to a marginal gain in social
surplus that is exactly o¤set by a gain in bidder surplus. The introduction of
the bundling parameter yields an additional marginal gain in social surplus
(due to additional sales of the other objects). This insight is similar to the
one appearing in McAfee et al. (1989)s study of a monopoly problem. In
addition, the introduction of the bundling parameter induces here a decrease
in bidders surplus due to the surcharge that bidder i must pay whenever
some other bidder j would get all objects if i were not present (this extra
e¤ect, that also played a role in Proposition 2, does not arise in the monopoly
problem. The two e¤ects together yields the result of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 makes a local argument around the optimal separate auc-
tions. It does not characterize the optimal combination of reserve prices and
mixed bundling, nor does it give an estimate of the amount to be won by
mixed bundling.
3.5 Asymmetric -auctions
An interesting question is whether in a symmetric setting the optimal -
auction is symmetric in the sense that it treats the bidders anonymously.
The following example18 illustrates that this need not be the case.
Example 4 There are two bidders competing for one object. Valuations
are independently distributed across bidders, and take two values19: v with
probability p and v with probability 1  p , where v > v. The only parameter
in a symmetric single-object -auction is the reserve price: setting a low
reserve price yields expected revenue of p2v + (1  p2)v , while setting a high
reserve price yields p(2   p)v. We now construct an asymmetric -auction
that outperforms both of these, and thus all, symmetric -auctions.
Let "i = " and 
"
j = v v where i (j) refers here to the allocation where i
(j) receives the object. For small values of ", the allocation and the payments
in the "-auction are given by the following table:
vj = v vj = v
vi = v i wins; ti =  "+ v + (v   v) j wins; tj =   (v   v) + v + "
vi = v j wins; tj = v j wins; tj = v
.
18The same example may be used to illustrate that adding asymmetric bidder-specic
weights (see Roberts, 1979) may also increase revenue.
19The same conclusions will hold for distributions with continuous density approaching
the discrete one considered here.
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Thus, expected revenue is given by
p(1  p)(v   ") + [1  p(1  p)]v + p2"
= p(1  p)v + [1  p(1  p)]v + p (2p  1) "
This expression exceeds p2v + (1   p2)v for p > 1
2
and exceeds p(2   p)v
for large values of v. Thus, whenever p > 1
2
and v is su¢ ciently large, the
asymmetric "-auction generates more revenue than the optimal symmetric
-auction.
4 Conclusion
We have identied the role of mixed bundling for raising revenue in a multi-
object auction without a resale market. We have shown that it is neither
in the self-interest of the auctioneer to sell the objects in separate, e¢ cient
auctions, nor to force the sale of the entire bundle of objects to a single
bidder.
The direct mechanisms used in this paper (which are theoretically easy
to dene and work with) can be seen as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
for a society with an additional virtualagent, who receives no objects, but
gets utility when bundling allocations are being chosen. Thus, even though
the real agentsvaluations are assumed to be additive, the virtual agent has
preferences that imply complementarity among objects. An interesting
question is whether one can implement mixed bundling via more intuitive
bidding mechanisms (e.g., an ascending auction). The answer to this question
is not entirely clear since complementarities are known to distort other agents
incentives in ascending-bid auctions (see for example Ausubel and Milgrom,
2002).
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